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RUMINATIONS ON DIXIE DRIVE IT YOURSELF
VERSUS AMERICAN BEVERAGE COMPANY
Wex S. Malone*
THE DILEMMA

Of all the substantive torts problems with which a judge
must contend it seems to me that the most exasperating and
elusive is that of determining how far legal protection should
extend. The nastiness of this job becomes fully apparent only
when the trier must face it at a time when he is saddled with
the responsibility of deciding a specific controversy. Until then
the permissible extent to which law can afford protection is
regarded merely as something that is determinable through
recourse to an assortment of generalities that parade in the
law books under the banner of "proximate cause."
The wholly inept character of all proximate causation language has been emphasized so many time that only a brief
reference is appropriate here.' Fourteen years ago Louisiana
attorney Jesse McDonald, then a third year law student, pointed
out in this Review the amazing variety of nonsense phrases that
make up the world of proximate cause, and he sampled the mass
of inconsistent banalities which Louisiana courts-along with
courts everywhere-have solemnly pronounced in their decisions
over past years.2 It has sometimes been said that conduct is the
proximate cause of only those consequences that "might have
been anticipated by ordinary forecast and not [of] those consequences arising from a combination of his fault with circumstances of an extraordinary nature."8 But a court on another
occasion could observe with equal assurance that it is no defense
"that the particular injurious consequence was unforeseen, improbable, and not to have reasonably expected so long as it
was the natural consequence of the negligence." (Emphasis
added.) 4 The "cause" that leads to liability may thus be iden• Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Among the best discussions are L. GREEN, THE RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE (1927); Lewis, PROXIMATE CAUSE IN LAW, 7 FLA. B.A.J. 109, 138, 158
(1933); Morris, On the Teaching of Legal Cause, 39 COL. L. REv. 1087 (1939);
Campbell, Duty, Fault and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 402.
2. McDonald, Proximate Cause in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 391 (1956);
W.

MALONE & L.

GUERRY,

READINGS IN LOUISIANA

TORTS LAW 129 (1970).

3. Moore v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 43 La. Ann. 792, 797, 9 So.
433, 434 (1891).
4. Atkins v. Bush, 141 La. 180, 188, 74 So. 897, 899 (1917). See also Lasyone v. Zenoria Lbr. Co., 163 La. 185, 187, 111 So. 670, 672 (1927).
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tified as "natural," or, as in another decision, "efficient," or,
again, it may be said that the proximate cause is the one that
is "inextricably interwoven with the subsequent occurrences."
But, enough of this. Few judges of today would seriously
question the observation that the phrases of proximate cause
are little more than gaudy ribbons with which the package
of liability may be decorated once its contents have already
been fixed by the court through resort to some other mystique.
But even though a judge is satisfied that causation language
fails to afford any dependable answer to the question as to how
far liability can be extended in a concrete piece of litigation,
he cannot enjoy the luxury of allowing the inquiry to lie idle
and unanswered. He is obliged to reach some conclusion in each
specific instance and to pronounce judgment accordingly. How
does he do this? What impels him to answer as he does, and,
equally important, how can he articulate the conclusion he has
reached in language which will be acceptable to law men and
that will afford at the same time at least some suggestion as
to what prompted the judge's decision? Even though the answer
to this inquiry must be halting and modest, let it at least be
honest and free of drivel.
The burden of the pages that follow is to suggest that in
the writer's opinion the Louisiana Supreme Court decision,
7
Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Company,
appears to afford the most direct and constructive approach that
has yet been made in this state to the problem with which we
are here concerned. This decision, now in its eighth year, has
been discussed, applied, distinguished, or at least recognized
as authority in nearly sixty subsequent Louisiana opinions.
During this period there has thus accumulated enough judicial
accretion to make possible a fair appraisal of the decision's
role in Louisiana jurisprudence. I beg the reader's indulgence
if, for the sake of brevity (and without regional or political
implications), I refer to the decision hereafter simply as Dixie.
THE BACKGROUND
The facts of the Dixie controversy are not complicated.
Plaintiff was a commercial lessor of motor vehicles and it had
5. Allen v. Louisiana Creamery, Inc., 184 So. 395, 397 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1938).
6. Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So.2d 513, 519 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948).

7. 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962).

1970] RUMINATIONS ON DIXIE DRIVE IT YOURSELF

365

leased the truck in question to L, who was operating it for his
own purposes at the time with which we are concerned. Defendant's employee was driving a tractor-trailer type beverage
truck, and he was proceeding from Baton Rouge to New Orleans
on U.S. Highway 61 when he experienced trouble with his
engine, which brought his truck to a halt on one of the two
southbound lanes of that thoroughfare. The driver failed to put
out flags or signals as required by statute,8 although a period
of eight or ten minutes elapsed during which this could have
been done before the ensuing collision that gave rise to the
lawsuit. L was also proceeding southward in plaintiff's truck
when he saw defendant's truck ahead at about 200 feet, at
which time it appeared to be moving. Momentarily thereafter,
L found that his own truck was being overtaken by another
southbound vehicle which moved into the left lane. When,
therefore, L became aware that defendant's truck was in fact
stationary, he was trapped in any effort to move into the left
lane and thus avoid a rear-end collision. In the ensuing mishap,
apparently only the rented truck driven by L and belonging to
plaintiff was damaged.
It was agreed by all judges in both the court of appeal and
in the Supreme Court that L must be regarded as negligent
in failing to recognize earlier that defendant's truck was stationary. Proper alertness would have enabled him to reduce
his speed below the 45 miles per hour at which he was in fact
proceeding, and this should have been done at a time when the
predicament could have been avoided. However, it will become
important to our discussion later to recall that L's admitted
misconduct was a mere shortcoming in his alertness and responsiveness. He was not chargeable with excessive speed, or with
operating faulty equipment, or with conscious chance-taking
of any kind.
In denying the lessor recovery for the loss of his vehicle,
the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit recognized that
the defendant was negligent in failing to put out the signal
required by statute both fore and aft of the vehicle.9 It further
conceded that the negligence of L, the lessee, could not be
imputed to plaintiff, the lessor. Hence contributory negligence
was not at issue. Nevertheless the court first announced that
8. L . R.S. 32:442 (1950).
9. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 128 So.2d
841 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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the negligence of defendant had become passive, and from this
it concluded that the "sole proximate cause . . .was the negli-

gence of the driver of the plaintiff truck."'10 The opinion did
not explain why this must, or even should, be so. One may
suspect that the court was influenced by some assumed rule
that would arbitrarily place the legal responsibility upon the
last culpable human actor in point of time, and exempt all
those antecedent to him. There was a time in the past when
such a rule enjoyed some small following in the courts." It is
possibly an outgrowth of another even older and less defensible
argument that in the event that there are successive wrongdoers, the injured party should have recourse against only one
of them-which, most dramatically, is the latest one.' 2 Obviously, current modern conceptions of joint or solidary tort
liability and the ensuing adjustment that can be made between
the defendants themselves through contribution or indemnity
have put to rout any notion that, one wrongdoer must be selected
for liability to the exclusion of all others.
The conferring of immunity upon the unlawfully parked
motorist by merely holding that the intervening negligence of
the later oncoming driver operates to break the chain of causation is not tenable as an arbitrary unqualified proposition even
when expressed in the current rubric of proximate cause. As
long ago as 1869 in the first textbook to appear on negligence,
the authors, Shearman and Redfield, observed that the mere fact
that intervening negligence of another was the nearest cause
in the order of time would not of itself prevent the defendant's
wrong from being regarded as proximate cause.' 3 A later edition
of this same well-known textbook in 1880 elaborated this proposition by observing that whenever the intervening negligent
conduct was of a character that could be anticipated to follow
the, original act, the latter could still be regarded as the proximate cause of the ultimate damage.' 4 Again, when the same
matter came up for consideration during the preparation of the
Restatement of Torts, the views expressed earlier by Shearman
and Redfield were made even more explicit by the Reporter
10. Id. at 843.

11. Eldredge, Culpable Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L.
REv. 121 (1937); W. PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS 285 (3d ed. 1964).
12. The origin of this idea has been attributed to the classic case, Vicars
v. Wilcocks, 8 East. 1 (1806). See the discussion in Bohlen, Contributory
Negligence, 21 HAV. L. REv. 233, 237 (1908).
13. T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE § 10, at 9 (1st ed. 1869).
14. T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLGENCS § 34, at 38 (4th ed. 1888).
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and his Advisors. Section 447 of the Restatement of Torts
provides in substance that the intervening negligent act of
another does not serve as a superseding cause unless a reasonable man, knowing the situation, would regard it as "highly
extraordinary" that such other should have behaved as he did.' 5
Unless these observations are to be rejected, the conclusion of
the court of appeal was erroneous. Certainly it would not be
regarded as beyond reasonable foresight that a driver of a
vehicle approaching the defendant's unlighted obstruction from
the rear would fail to discover that the defendant's vehicle
was stationary quite as promptly as the mythical reasonable
man would have made such discovery; above all, such a shortcoming in his power of observation cannot be regarded as something "highly extraordinary." Accordingly, the decided course
of decision (not without exception) 16 has been toward the
position that mere inadvertence on the part of the later oncoming
driver does not prevent recovery against the obstructor through
17
resort to any acceptable proximate cause rationale.
We have observed that the court of appeal also stressed the
fact that the defendant's negligence had become merely passive.
Such an observation by the court could serve only to confuse
the inquiry even further. The term passive negligence probably
stems from the once important common law distinction between
a cause of action sounding in trespass and one sounding in
trespass on the case. The old action of trespass could not be maintained unless the defendant could be charged with setting into
motion some force that directly inflicted injury on the plaintiff.
If he had created only a static, even though highly dangerous,
state of affairs, the victim, if he was to recover, must choose
OF TORTS § 447 (1965).
16. I.e., Medved v. Doolittle, 220 Minn. 352, 19 N.W.2d 788 (1945), criti-

15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

cized in Morris, Proximate Cause in

Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. Rzv. 185, 199

(1950); Godwin v. Nixon, 236 N.C. 232, 74 S.E.2d 24 (1953).
17. I.e., vehicle parked without signals held proximate cause by court as
a matter of law, or submitted to jury under binding instructions to that
effect; Wills v. Anchor Cartage & Storage Co., 26 Ohio App. 66, 159 N.E.
124 (1926); Trefzer v. Stiles, 56 N.M. 296, 243 P.2d 605 (1952); Sample v. Spencer, 222 N.C. 580, 24 S.E.2d 241 (1943); Wilson v. Edwards, 138 W.Va. 613, 77
S.E. 164 (1953). A jury was permitted to find defendant liable despite intervening negligence: Borneman v. Lusha, 221 Wis. 359, 266 N.W. 799 (1936); United
States v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 208 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1953); Ponder
v. McKenzie, 89 Ga. App. 846, 81 S.E.2d 551 (1954); Savage Truck Line v.
Traylor, 193 Va. 579, 69 S.E.2d 478 (1952). See in general cases in Annot.,
67 A.L.R.2d 18, 72-82 (1959). See also W. PROssEpi, THE LAW oF TORTS § 51, at
313 (3d ed. 1964), and cases cited therein at n. 48.
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trespass on the case as his form of action.1 8 But the difference
between active and passive wrongdoing was important only
as it affected the propriety of the form of action, and liability
could be forthcoming with equal ease in either event if the
correct form were chosen. Since the abolition of the old forms
of action, there remains no reason for distinguishing the two
types of wrongdoing. Certainly the villain who places poison
in his victim's soup before the latter has eaten it is entitled to
no more sympathy than the culprit who stabs his victim in the
back. Furthermore, whenever an intervening act of negligence
on the part of a third party is discoverable, it necessarily follows that the defendant's earlier wrongdoing must be regarded
as having become passive. This is inescapable because if the
original wrongdoer were still in action, his misconduct and that
of the third party must necessarily be regarded as concurrent,
and there would be no intervening wrong. Hence the activepassive distinction adds nothing to the discussion.
We have already suggested that without difficulty the
Supreme Court could have reversed the court of appeal and
imposed liability upon the owner of the unlawfully parked
truck merely by observing that intervening negligence would
not preclude liability on the part of the original wrongdoer
provided that the inadvertence of the motorist following was
not something that was unforeseeable. As a matter of fact,
courts of appeal on several earlier occasions had adopted a
position opposed to that of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
in the Dixie controversy. 19 But instead of adopting this narrow
proximate cause approach the Supreme Court, speaking through
Sanders, J., succeeded in using the occasion to suggest a more
realistic attack upon the entire phenomenon of negligence liability. Justice Sanders disposed of the proximate cause and
intervening negligence argument by countering,
"The thrust of this formulation of law is toward relieving
all but the last wrongdoer of liability to an innocent victim
in torts involving intervening negligence. This restrictive
doctrine finds little support in legal theory. We do not
18. Reynolds v. Clarke, 92 Eng. Rep. 410 (1725).

sions will be found in 3 T.

STMET,

Tne

One of the best discus-

FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL IaABILTY Chs.

XVII, XVIII (1906).
19. See e.g., Blanks v. Saenger Theaters, Inc., 19 La. App. 305, 138 So.
883 (2d Cir. 1931). In fact, Giorlando v. Maitrejean, 22 So.2d 564 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1945), decided by the same circuit, is almost indistinguishable from
Dixie.
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(Emphasis added.)
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as applied in this case."

The italicized qualification in the concluding sentence is
important. The opinion carefully avoids espousing the opposed
and equally arbitrary position that intervening negligence can
never serve to immunize the original wrongdoer. Whether it
should or should not have such effect is a matter to be left
open and determined by other considerations in each instance.
An appreciation of this need for plasticity is essential to a
sympathetic understanding of the Dixie decision. On several
subsequent occasions our courts have indicated clearly their
;awareness of the supreme court's intention in this respect:
"We believe the cited case authority for the proposition that mere chronology of events cannot be relied upon
by the passively negligent defendant who seeks escape
from liability on the ground that subsequent actions of a
third party caused the injury. Though one's negligence may
be passive and have come to rest, it nevertheless subjects
one to liability for all resulting injury within the protective
scope of the duty or burden of care that has been violated,
when the subsequent negligence of another in combination
therewith produces injury to an innocent third party."
21
(Emphasis added.)

Similarly, the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit observed,
"It (Dixie) does not stand for the proposition that once the
defendant is found negligent all subsequent or concurrent actions
on the part of the plaintiff must be disregarded in determining
whether or not a plea of contributory negligence will bar
22
recovery of the plaintiff."
The opinion then proceeds to the serious business of pointing
out that the term, legal cause, or proximate cause, embraces
20. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
483, 137 So.2d 298, 304 (1962).
21. Woods v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 172 So.2d 100, 114 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965).
22. Clingman v. Millerville Mud Sales, Inc., 146 So.2d 240, 242 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962). It must be noted, however, that occasional intimations to the
effect that the passive negligence rule has been abolished have appeared:
Steagall v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 So.2d 433, 436 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962); Lamed v. Wallace, 146 So.2d 434, 439 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962). On one
occasion the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit felt itself so constrained
by its interpretation of Dixie as an arbitrary rule that it felt obliged to distinguish the case. Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 So.2d 846 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969) (on rehearing).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

two entirely different inquiries. In the instant case it must be
determined, first, whether the negligence of the obstructing
driver was a cause-in-fact of the collision, and, only when this
inquiry of fact has been answered favorably to the plaintiff,
can the court proceed to the second aspect-a policy determination as to whether the defendant should be relieved of liability
because of the intervening negligence of the driver of the
Dixie truck. This suggested bifurcation of the inquiry is basic.
The first question involves a determination of fact, while the
second is a matter of fixing policy. The distinction is between
"what happened?" on the one hand, and "what should law do
about it?" on the other. The two inquiries cannot be blended
under any single cabalistic phrase of "proximate cause."
CAUSE IN FACT

The determination of cause-in-fact is launched by fixing
as precisely as possible the piece of conduct-the exact act or
omission-with which the defendant is charged. This item of
behavior must be regarded as a cause-in-fact of the harm suffered by the victim whenever the trier concludes that the same
harm would probably not have occurred if the defendant had
not engaged in the conduct with which he is charged. A causein-fact can thus be defined as a necessary antecedent, and the
process of determining the existence or non-existence of cause
is essentially one in which the trier speculates as to what would
have happened if the conduct in question had not taken place.
Since this assumed state of affairs represents a negation of the
situation as it actually existed, we can only engage in surmise.
The permissible degrees of likelihood are many, and our conjecture may lead us to conclude that the same harmful consequence would have come into being as a certainty, a probability, or a possibility, even if defendant had behaved otherwise than as he actually did behave. It is at this point that the
usual and accepted requirement that facts be established by
probabilitiescomes into play. If the victim would probably not
have encountered the harm but for the defendant's conduct, it
can be concluded that such conduct was a cause in fact and
that the victim has sustained the required burden of proof on
that issue.
Several matters deserve to be emphasized at this point.
First, the relationship of cause and effect envisioned here in-
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volves one assumed fact which can be treated as cause and
another assumed fact which can be regarded as consequence.
The process becomes utterly meaningless if we attempt to
pervert it to other uses. We can inquire meaningfully whether
defendant's failure to blow his horn was a cause of plaintiffpedestrian's being struck, for two facts are involved-horn
blowing, and impact. But an inquiry as to whether defendant's
negligence or the unlawful quality of his conduct was a cause
of harm is meaningless. Such terms as negligent and unlawful
can serve only the functions of qualitative descriptive or policy
evaluations. They are useful to assist in passing a judgment
condemning or approving specific acts or omissions, but they
are not acts or omissions themselves, and hence they cannot
serve as causes. Much difficulty can be avoided if it is borne
in mind that cause is exclusively a fact inquiry in which we
are interested only in what happened, or what might have happened. This by no means suggests that the trier is invited to
ignore policy limitations when he eventually passes judgment.
It does mean, however, that policy and fact should be kept
separate and that causation should be maintained utterly devoid
of any policy overtones.
Second, the version of a cause as an indispensable factual
antecedent obliges us to conclude that every consequence has
innumerable causes. The failure of the defendant driver to blow
his horn was a cause of the striking of plaintiff-pedestrian since
we can conclude that if the horn had been blown the pedestrian
would probably have avoided being struck. But it may also be
equally true that if plaintiff had not enjoyed a good night's
rest before the accident, he probably would have remained in
bed and thus would not have encountered the defendant when
he did. Therefore, the good rest was also an indispensable
antecedent and serves equally as a cause. For this reason it is
inaccurate to refer to any single antecedent as the cause.
Although it may be entirely appropriate to conclude ultimately
that a single selected antecedent should be regarded as the
cause-for-which-liability-should-be-imposed, this conclusion follows from a resort to independent policy considerations that
are brought to bear on the claim after causation has already
been determined.
With this approach in mind, Justice Sanders succeeded in
concluding that the defendant's neglect in installing the signals
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on the highway required by statute was a cause-in-fact of the
ensuing collision. In order to reach this conclusion a speculation
on the facts was required: Let it be assumed that the beverage
truck had installed red signal flags 100 feet behind and in front
of the vehicle (as the statute required), is it nevertheless more
probable than not that L would have failed to observe that the
vehicle was stationary at a time when he could have brought
his truck to a halt effectively from the speed of 45 miles per
hour at which he was then proceeding? This is the only causation issue involved. Numerous factual observations must be
brought into play before the trier can reach his answer: the
fact that L was not very alert, the fact that the highway was
wet and that it was drizzling or misting at the time, the fact
that L's lights were on and his windshield wipers were going.
With these matters in mind, can the trier conclude that a signal
100 feet to the rear of the truck would probably have alerted L
and thus have saved the day? It is important to bear in mind
that L did not fail to make a timely observation as to the
presence of the truck. He delayed only in interpreting what he
saw ahead as a truck in motion, rather than as a stationary
truck. This is important to the conjecture, because a red signal
on the highway warns the oncoming driver that he faces a
stationary object-an obstruction-ahead. Although the question
was admittedly not free from difficulty, the court was satisfied
on the probabilities and it observed that, "the mere possibility
that the accident would have occurred despite the required
precautions does not break the chain of causation." 28
The supreme court's version of causality as an inquiry that
is based solely upon fact and that should be divorced from
the ultimate determination as to whether defendant ought to
be held liable is a major contribution to a clear analysis of
negligence cases. The reader is reminded by Dixie that the
ultimate fixing of the boundaries of policy does indeed lie ahead
in every difficult case, but that it does not lie here-in causation.
One feature of that portion of the Dixie opinion dealing
with cause does introduce a small measure of confusion: the
court identifies cause-in-fact with the term, substantial factor.24
23. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471,
487, 137 So.2d 298, 304 (1962).
24. "Negligent conduct Is a cause in fact of harm to another if it was a
substantial factor in bringing about that harm." Dixie Drive It Yourself
System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 482, 137 So.2d 298, 302 (1962).
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The difficulty here lies in the term "substantial," which might
appear to suggest that the factor should not be regarded as a
cause-in-fact unless it is important policy-wise. This could tend
to reintroduce all the vagaries of proximate cause. For this
reason more clarification by the court at this point would be
desirable. But the ambiguity played no role in the Dixie decision, for the court promptly announced, "Under the circumstances of this case the negligent conduct is undoubtedly a substantial factor in bringing about the collision if the collision
would not have occurred without it."' 25

Thus it identifies sub-

stantial factor and the indispensable antecedent test as being the
same.
The influence of the Dixie opinion in prompting courts of
appeal to regard causation within its proper and modest perspective as a factual matter to be determined according to the
probabilities has been great. The decision has been resorted
to with approval in a large number of subsequent decisions
even when no serious "proximate cause" problem faced the
courts.2

8

THE PROTECTION AFFORDED

BY

RUiLEs OF LAW

Even though the issues of wrongdoing and cause were
answered favorably to the Dixie Drive-It-Yourself System, it
does not follow that liability must be automatically forthcoming.
There remains the ultimate policy problem: should recovery
be allowed despite the carelessness of L, the driver of plaintiff's truck? It can be noted that L's inadvertence was also a
cause (indispensable antecedent) of the damage to the vehicle.
25. Id.
26. Levert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 140 So.2d 811 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
(unreasonable gap between platform and floor was a cause of patron falling
even though other factors contributed); Perkins v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 243
La. 829, 147 So.2d 646 (1962) (train speed in excess of statutory limit not
cause of striking automobile, since accident would probably have happened
even if train were proceeding at lower speed); Naquin v. Marquette Cas. Co.,
244 La. 569, 153 So.2d 395 (1963) (plaintiff need not negate all other possible
causes; probability formula stressed); Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi
Tank Co., 157 So.2d 261 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). Would installation of safety
device have prevented escape of gasoline? Court of appeal's negative answer
was reversed by the supreme court in Home Gas & Fuel Co. v. Mississippi
Tank Co., 246 La. 265, 166 So.2d 252 (1964). See also Bertrand v. Trunkline
Gas Co., 149 So.2d 152 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Bodan v. American Employers
Ins. Co., 160 So.2d 410 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Lee v. Carwile, 168 So.2d 469
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), noted, 26 LA. L. REv. 518 (1966) and W. MALONE &
L. GuERRY, READINGS IN LOUISIANA ToRTs LAw 518 (1970); Courtault v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 169 So.2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Muse v.
Patterson & Co., 182 So.2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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The supreme court at this point proceeded to make a direct
policy assault on the problem. It turned to the criminal statute
whose violation had served to make the defendant's conduct
wrongful and it inquired as to whether this statute should be
so construed as to extend protection against the risk, or hazard,
that later a confused or inattentive motorist approaching from
the rear might fail to advert to the danger ahead unless he
were given specific advance warning by the light or flag required
by the statute. The court's affirmative answer to this inquiry
determined the outcome of the litigation favorably to plaintiff.
In truth, there was little novelty in this approach. Courts
had long before explored the protective ambit of criminal
statutes or ordinances in civil controversies. Usually, however,
this had resulted in an announcement that the risk or hazard
presented in the case at hand was beyond the scope of protection afforded by the criminal measure invoked by the plaintiff.
In other words the approach had brought about denials of recovery. One of the earliest and the most clearly formulated of these
is Lopes v. Sahuque,2 7 decided in 1905. Here the defendant had
allowed his horse and cart to stand in the street unattended
in violation of a New Orleans city ordinance. The plaintiff, a
small child, was injured when some other children who were
playing upon the cart allowed it to be suddenly tilted so that
it struck the plaintiff. The court denied recovery. In so doing,
it observed, "There is not a day but some court is called upon
to restrict the scope of statutes so as to bring their operation
within the limits of the intention and object of the General
Assembly, however general the terms may be. Courts are much
more limited in the interpretation of the statutes-that is, in
ascertaining the meaning of the words employed by the Legislature-than they are in the application and construction of
the laws, taking notice of the object and purpose of the same."2
The court then proceeded directly to the point:
"The ordinance declared to have been violated in this
case was not intended to protect and safeguard generally
children who might go into the street and there enter upon
or into the property of citizens which might have been
incautiously or even improperly left there. That was not
its purpose, and injury to a child received under such circumstances would not be the natural and direct consequences
27. 114 La. 1004, 38 So. 810 (1905).
28. Id. at 1016, 38 So. at 814.
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of the violation of the ordinance, but a collateral consequence
dependent as to its legal effect upon the special facts under
2' 9
which the injury occurred.
We have noted that the court in the Lopes case emphasized
the propriety of resorting to a determination of the scope
of a statute for the purpose of restricting its operation. We
encounter more difficulty and confusion when we examine the
decisions prior to Dixie in an effort to discover some earlier
case espousing an interpretation that would serve to expand,
rather than to restrict, the area of protection afforded in a civil
suit by some criminal statute. Cases are not infrequently found
holding that the intervention of some piece of conduct by a third
party (or by the plaintiff himself) did not serve to over-extend
the permissible range of coverage afforded by a criminal measure. We are obliged, however, to note that in each such instance
the court expressed itself as satisfied that the intervening conduct in question was not negligent in character. In one case80
a safety statute obliged railroads to install "tattletails" or knotted
ropes suspended on frames above the tracks in order to warn
employees on the tops of the cars of an approaching bridge or
other dangerous intrusion over the tracks. When an employee
suffered injury which could have been avoided if the defendant
railroad had provided the warning device, the defendant insisted
that the victim himself should have known of the danger
independently of any warning that might have been afforded.
The court, after observing that a purpose of the statute was
to afford a warning to the unwary, continued by emphasizing
that any inattention on the victim's part probably resulted from
a justifiable reliance upon the warning that would have been
afforded if the defendant had fulfilled its duty. The court thus
was able to exonerate the plaintiff of blame.
The criminal measure involved in Maggiore v. Laundry &
Dry Cleaning Service 1 was an ordinance that forbade the leaving of a vehicle standing in a public way without removing the
ignition key. An electric propelled truck was allowed by defendant to stand on a narrow New Orleans street with the key
in place so that an application of outside force to the vehicle
could excite the electric motor and cause it to move forward
on its own power. When the presence of this truck interfered
29. Id.
30. Halley v. Texas & P. Ry., 113 La. 533, 539, 37 So. 131, 134 (1904).
31. 150 So. 394 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933).
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with access into the narrow street from a private driveway,
the plaintiff and a friend attempted to push it away from the
obstructed drive. As a result the motor started and the vehicle
propelled itself against the plaintiff, injuring him. In imposing liability the court of appeal found that one of the purposes
of the ordinance violated was to insure that such an accident
would not occur. The court, however, took care to point out
that the plaintiff's conduct in attempting to move the truck
should not be regarded as negligent. We are left, therefore,
with the impression that the benefit of the ordinance would
have been denied the plaintiff if his efforts had been less cautious than they were.
Alexander v. Standard Oil Co. of La . 2 affords an instance
where the court dealt with our problem in clear and unequivocal
language. It was faced with a situation where a child suffered
injury while employed by defendant contrary to the Child Labor
Law. The court expressly adverted to the purpose of the statute
in support of its holding that the victim's own carelessness
was not available as a defense to the employer: "The reason
children are forbidden to be employed in dangerous occupations
being that they are presumed to be incapable of taking care of
themselves, it would seem to be illogical to hold them responsible for their negligence."-" The force of this observation was
weakened, however, when the court thereafter succeeded in
finding that the child plaintiff was not negligent.
The caution with which the courts in these early decisions
had tackled the prospect of affording protection against the risk
of intervening negligence is probably attributable to the fact
that in each instance above, the intervening behavior with
which the court was obliged to deal was the plaintiff's own
conduct. If the victim himself were found to be contributorily
negligent, this would be available as a defense even though all
other considerations had favored recovery. Apart from this
contributory negligence intervolvement there is little reason
to suspect that the courts would have proceeded as hesitantly
as they did. For we may recall our earlier observation that the
Louisiana courts had become thoroughly accustomed to extending protection against the risk of subsequent third party misconduct by simply resorting to doctrines of proximate cause.8
32. 140 La. 54, 72 So. 806 (1916).
33. Id. at 68, 72 So. at 811.
34. See cases cited at note 19 supra.
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I suggest that Dixie's potential for usefulness lies, not in
any novelty that inheres in the decision, but rather in its insistence that cause and legal duty be approached as separate
matters and that considerations of policy be liberated from the
chrysallis of causation jargon and allowed to stand on their
own footing.
The specific policy inquiry that the court faced in the Dixie
decision can be posed without much difficulty: Why did the
legislature adopt a criminal statute requiring that all motorists
who come to an extended halt on the public way must install
flags or lanterns at a considerable distance both fore and aft of
their vehicles? What risks did the lawmakers have in mind
when they effected this enactment? Did they envision the
prospect that some oncoming motorist might not be sufficiently
alert to avoid a rear-end collision unless he were forewarned
by such signals? If so, and the court concludes that one purpose of the statute was to alert even those whose state of
unwariness is not readily excusable, can the judge consistently
refer thereafter to that same state of inattention as a sound
reason in support of a judgment that would relieve the obstructing motorist of liability? On this the opinion observed:
"To deny recovery because of the plaintiff's exposure
to the risk from which it was the purpose of the law to
protect him would nullify the statutory duty and render
its protection meaningless." 35
It seems to me that the merit of this opinion lies not in the
fact that the court arrived at an indisputably correct conclusion
on policy, which may or may not be the case, but rather in the
forthright recognition that the answer must lie within the
court's own version of the statutory purpose, be its image of
that purpose right or wrong. Under the attack suggested by
Dixie the court openly assumes the responsibility of passing
judgment according to its best light.
The problem of determining legislative intention is fraught
with difficulty and the judge who embarks on the task is constantly tempted toward self-delusion. Too frequently he finds
that he is only playing a game in a hall of mirrors. To begin
with, a statute such as that under consideration in Dixie is
entirely a criminal measure, and insofar as we can know, the
35. Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La
471, 492, 137 So.2d 298, 306 (1962).
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lawmakers were wholly indifferent toward civil liability. Otherwise, it is to be expected that they would have made some
mention of claims for damages. But even assuming that the
prospect of civil consequences rested vaguely in the back of a
lawmaker's mind, what can we surmise as to his "intention"
concerning the specific narrow little risk with which the court
was confronted in Dixie? If the legislator were asked about
the hazard of the inattentive motorist, would he not in all
honesty be obliged to reply, "Gosh, fellows, I must confess that
such a matter as that never entered my mind."?
Despite these difficulties, the court has elected to accept
the statutory criminal mandate as its guide in passing judgment
on the defendant's conduct, and it is this purely voluntary
acceptance of the criminal legislation that underlies the so-called
negligence per se rule.36 But having once made the legislative
measure its own, the court cannot escape the responsibility of
defining appropriate boundaries for its operation in each instance
and it must proceed to fix those risks that fall within or without the rule's protective ambit.
Whenever the terms of the statute itself afford some indication of the precise range of risks that the lawmakers had in
mind, or whenever some clue as to this may be afforded by an
examination of the measure in its entirety, the legislature's
intention will, of course, prevail. But more often than not the
court has no such assistance available in the truly difficult
case. In such instances it must be guided solely by its own
unaided judgment as to whether the statutory rule is appropriate
to the very special risk or hazard presented by the facts of the
controversy at hand. This calls for judicial legislation of the
36. In discussing the explanation of the negligence per se rule, Prosser
observed. "Perhaps the most satisfactory explanation is that the courts
are seeking, by something in the nature of judicial legislation, to further
the ultimate policy for the protection of individuals which they find underlying the statute, and which they believe the legislature must have had
in mind. The statutory standard of conduct is simply adopted voluntarily,
out of deference and respect for the legislature. This is borne out by a
considerable number of cases in which the terms of a criminal statute
have been applied in a civil action, notwithstanding the fact that the
statute was for some reason totally ineffective as a basis for criminal conviction-as where it had not been properly enacted, or did not exactly cover
the situation, or the defendant was incapable of crime, and could not be
prosecuted; and by one or two others in which there has been flat refusal
to accept a standard regarded as unreasonable." W. PaossnR, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 35, at 193 (3d ed. 1964). See also the excellent and profound discussion of Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46
HARv. L. Rav. 453 (1933).
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highest order, and the untrammeled judgment of the court
should not be impaired or hemmed in by any real or imagined
rule of "proximate cause."
The course of the decisions subsequent to Dixie presents an
interesting pattern indicating that generally the courts of appeal
have received the opinion with understanding and have applied
it with considerable ingenuity and common sense. Recovery has
been forthcoming without difficulty in the few cases that appear
to have involved precisely the same situation as in Dixie-that is
to say, where the driver of the vehicle approaching from the rear
was inattentive and struck the illegally parked car of the defendant.3 7 But when the situation becomes more complex and
involves something beyond a collision between these two vehicles
the courts have encountered trouble. This is neatly illustrated
in Woods v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.88 Here there were two
impacts: defendant's automobile stood unlighted in the highway
and was struck by a second carelessly driven vehicle, resulting
in injury to one of several passengers in the latter car. The court
encountered no difficulty at this point and allowed recovery
against both the driver and the defendant. But the matter did
not end there, for the resulting wreckage in the highway presented an obstruction onto which, fifteen minutes later, a carelessly driven truck plowed its way. This in turn resulted in an
injury to a second passenger in the same vehicle that had been
involved in the initial collision. Although the truck driver was
obviously responsible for this latter accident, could the same be
said of defendant whose violation of the warning statute had
initiated the sequence of events that resulted in the harm?
An unqualified affirmative answer here could prove troublesome indeed, for it would invite the contention in future litigation that whoever is responsible for an initial collision and resultant wreckage on the public way must respond without more ado
for all pile-ups that may thereafter be occasioned. The variety
of subsequent mishaps that could follow in the wake of a single
collision on a busy highway is almost unlimited. The pile-up
sequence may follow the initial collision immediately in point
of time, and with or without blame on the part of those persons
later involved. Or the second impact may be delayed fifteen min37. Champagne v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 170 So.2d 226
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); Woods v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 172 So.2d
100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
38. 172 So.2d 100 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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utes (as in the Woods case) or even longer. Again, oncoming
motorists, seeing the obstructing collision, may sustain injury in
their efforts to face the resultant congestion or to bypass the
wreckage; and, further, in so doing they may have been behaving with due caution for their own safety or they may have been
deliberately "chancing it." There may even be involved a collision between two vehicles, both of which arrived on the scene
after the initial accident. The problem as to how far the court
should extend its protection here is baffling. From one point of
view it can be argued that the defendant whose misconduct
results in rendering the public highway more perilous for those
who come along later could properly be made to pay the full
cost of the congestion risk for which his wrongdoing was a causein-fact.5 9 But the invitation to unlimited liability may well invite
caution. If the range of responsibility is to be limited, where
should the line be drawn? The court of appeal in the Woods case
felt that the elapsed time of fifteen minutes between the two
collisions was determinative, and it refused recovery. The decision represented the court's best estimate of policy, and who is
to say that it was right or that it was wrong? The decision was
a tough one, but the court knew exactly what it was facing and
it avoided all entrapments of proximate cause. The approach of
the Dixie decision was employed consistently throughout.
Another distinguishing feature of the Woods case deserves
attention. There were two distinct accidents. The defendant's
initial wrong of parking without lights was followed by impact
with another vehicle; and this impact, in its turn, brought into
being the spectacle of two helpless vehicles stalled on the public
thoroughfare. Under such a showing a new and independent
invitation to danger has arisen, and, in a sense, the original failure by the defendant to warn oncomers of the presence of his car
has spent its force policy-wise, except as it serves as a causal
antecedent to whatever follows. The perilous setting that now
leads to a pileup or other post accident mishap is one that tends
to generate its own characteristic problems, such as those suggested above. The risk of pileup is one that can follow indiscriminately in the wake of any kind of highway collision. Hence it
is not a matter of decisive importance whether the cause of the
initial impact was speed, inattention, driving with faulty equipment, or parking a vehicle without adequate warning.
39. Liability has sometimes been extended freely in such situations.
See the excellent discussion in Note, 9 LA. L. Rav. 421 (1949).
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Although the fact situation presented in Dixie was that of
a direct collision between the defendant's unlawfully parked
truck and the truck belonging to the plaintiff, frequently there
is no physical contact between the parked vehicle and the one
that ultimately suffers damage. For example, an oncoming driver
may fail to make a reasonable adjustment to the defendant's
obstruction and thus injure some other vehicle or its occupants.
This should not present a serious obstacle to recovery under the
newer approach. 40 Several instances of this kind had been faced
by the courts of appeal prior to the Dixie decision.4 . In each
the oncoming motorist was aware of the obstruction presented
by the defendant's vehicle and he thereafter conducted himself
in such a manner as to bring about a collision with plaintiff.
Illustrative here is Williams v. Pelican Creamery Inc.4 The
defendant's vehicle was unlawfully parked without provision of
lights as required by statute. The plaintiff thereafter approached
from the rear, saw defendant's car, and came to a halt, awaiting an opportunity to overtake. While he was so detained, a
truck to the rear of plaintiff's car moved out into the left lane
and attempted to overtake both vehicles. In so doing, a trailer
pulled by the large truck struck the plaintiff's car with such
force as to drive the vehicle into the parked truck, inflicting the
injuries in question. It is noteworthy that failure to have lights
on the parked truck was not a cause-in-fact of the incident,
since the plaintiff had safely brought his car to a halt, and the
driver of the overtaking truck was fully aware of the entire
picture.
In such situations as these the only effect of the obstructor's
negligence has been to interject an annoying impediment in the
path of the later oncoming motorist and thus to tempt him to
embark upon a negligent course of action. If he consciously and
deliberately encounters the congestion and then proceeds to
handle the situation poorly, can we safely conclude that this
risk of his creation must uniformly be regarded as one that can
40. Recovery for an accident of this type was allowed by the Court
of Appeal for the Third Circuit in Perry v. Herrin, 215 So.2d 167 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968). The unlawfully parked car of defendant highway department
resulted in a collision between two vehicles approaching the parked car
from opposite directions. The judges were not in accord as to which of
these latter two drivers was negligent, but it was agreed by all that the
innocent party could recover against the highway department.
41. Williams v. Pelican Creamery Inc., 30 So.2d 574 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1947); Ardoin v. Williams, 108 So.2d 817 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959); Dollar v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 37 So.2d 549 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948).
42. 30 So.2d 574 (La. App..1st Cir. 1947).
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appropriately be imposed upon the person responsible for the
initial obstruction?
In the earlier decisions of the type discussed above, recovery
was denied, usually with the observation that the obstructor's
negligence had become passive or that the intervening wrongdoing had broken the chain of causation. Without questioning the
wisdom of these decisions when tested on their own facts and
in terms of their outcome, one may nevertheless express concern
over the type of explanation afforded in the opinions. Resort to
the language of proximate cause here can invite an unduly
arbitrary disposition of the controversies. Is it indeed true that
even a highly dangerous obstruction of the public way created
by the defendant must always become a "passive" condition
whenever there is intervening wrongful conduct by some oncoming motorist? Does the intervening conduct serve to insulate
the original wrongdoer, so long as the later behavior can be
labeled "negligent," irrespective of how serious or how trivial
it may be? It seems to me that more elbow room is needed here
than can be afforded by pat phrases of proximate cause.
The subtle shadings of the risk patterns presented in such
cases as these can be illustrated by Steagall v. Houston Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co.,43 a decision that followed promptly in the wake of
Dixie. Defendant parked his car in a small shopping center so that
the rear wheels extended slightly more than two feet into the
traveled way in violation of a local ordinance. The vehicle in
which plaintiff was a passenger and which was being driven by
her husband proceeded up the highway toward the spot where
defendant's car protruded into the road. As he approached,
another vehicle coming from the opposite direction appeared
ahead, making it impossible for plaintiff's husband to move left
toward the center of the road. Consequently, he collided with
the protruding rear wheels of defendant's car and plaintiff, his
passenger, suffered resulting injuries. The husband was chargeable with failure to make a timely observation of the parked
car ahead and to control his vehicle accordingly. The controversy was presented to the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit on an exception of no cause of action. The court, relying
upon the Dixie decision, overruled the exception and remanded
the case for trial.
The difference (if there is one) between the hazard pre43. 138 So.2d 433 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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sented just above and the hazards characteristic of the cases
we have previously discussed is not one that is easy to put into
words. Here the defendant's unlawful obstruction served to
imperil the normal current of traffic as it was flowing by and
it imposed an unreasonable burden on the skill and alertness
of those who at the time were in active use of the highway. If
plaintiff's husband had safely brought his vehicle to a halt facing the rear of the illegally parked car and had thereafter proceeded to move out into the stream of traffic and in so doing
had negligently brought about a collision, the analogy of the
cases discussed earlier would be much closer, and liability on
the part of the original obstrucing motorist might plausibly be
denied. Yet it is upon distinctions such as these-which are
almost intuitive-that judgment may properly be made to depend. Any legal rule or formula to which the court may appropriately resort for guidance in these situations should be one
that makes possible a free range for the exercise of the judge's
own talent. The truly useful formula may suggest, but it should
never compel, the judgment to be pronounced.
Several recent decisions invite speculation concerning the
wide variety of factors that may properly exert their influence
in situations involving civil liability for unlawfully parked vehicles. First, the demands of a given criminal prohibition against
parking may appear to be overly exacting or, again, a statutory
prohibition of such conduct may present troublesome ambiguities when its interpretation is attempted. Louisiana Revised
Statutes 32:141 (A) affords an illustration. Under its terms the
criminal prohibition against parking on the public highway admits an exception wherever the highway is inside a "business
or residential district." If the parking that leads to an accident
occurs at a spot that is only doubtfully included within the statutory prohibition, should a court not feel free to take this into
consideration when the statute is invoked in a civil controversy?
Similarly, parking may be prohibited within certain narrow areas
solely for the reason that congestion is to be expected at such
limited places. If the driver unlawfully parked his vehicle at
such a spot during a period when no congestion existed, might
his conduct not be regarded as excusable for the purpose of civil
litigation, even though he would be subject to a criminal proceeding? 44 Is it not arguable that whenever the hazard of con44. Attention here is called to Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 So.2d 846

(La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), where a parking statute of this type was involved.
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gestion that prompted a prohibition of this sort is missing, resort
to the statute should not be available in a suit for damages?
The same problem of excusable violation may arise by reason
of extenuating circumstances that attended the defendant's conduct in parking his vehicle. An excellent illustration suggesting
how such considerations may have influenced judgment is afforded by the supreme court decision in Rowe v. Travelers Ins.
Co. 45 The court here was obviously impressed with the fact that

the left rear wheel of the defendant's car intruded only marginally on the highway. It also clearly appeared that at the time
of the accident the car had remained there for only a few minutes
while the driver, a woman, and her friends were attempting to
cope with an emergency arising from a sudden motor failure.
The lights of the stalled vehicle were burning and there was
nothing to interfere with the ability of an oncoming driver to
see the road and the parked car. The court, however, was obliged
to conclude that the driver of the parked vehicle could have
moved it completely from the highway and that she was negligent in failing to do so. The car was struck by a truck approaching from the rear, whose driver failed to observe the lighted
parked car until he was thirty feet or less from its rear. The
court concluded that he should have appreciated the situation
earlier. As a result of the collision the truck, which had been
leased from plaintiff, was damaged and the present suit was
instituted by the lessor. It can thus be seen that if we ignore the
extenuating circumstances attendant upon the parking, the facts
are almost indistinguishable from those presented in Dixie. The
court, however, denied recovery against the driver of the parked
car. The opinion wholly ignored the Dixie case and made the
following observation in the uninformative language of proximate cause:
"Although Mrs. Rowe did not remove her vehicle entirely off the highway, Coe has failed to establish that this
constituted negligence which was a proximate or contributing cause of the accident. The sole and the proximate cause
of this collision was the failure of Coe to observe what he
could and should have observed.

'4

6

This writer cannot escape the conclusion that there is an
adequate explanation of the Rowe decision, and that it lies in
45. 253 La. 659, 219 So.2d 486 (1969).
46. Id. at 667, 219 So.2d at 489.
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the court's conviction (although unexpressed) that the particular
violation involved was excusable for the purpose of civil litigation. The objection may be raised at this point that no violation
of a criminal statute can be regarded as excusable in a civil suit
unless the same conduct would be excusable in a criminal proceeding. I suggest, however, in reply that such an argument
does not take fully into account the underlying basis of the socalled negligence per se rule. We may bear in mind our previous
observation that when a court accepts a criminal statute as a
standard for civil liability it does so through its wholly voluntary choice. 47 The average criminal statute imposes no requirement, either express or implied, that it must control the disposition of a mere suit for damages. The judge who elects to
import a criminal rule does so only because he regards it as
being appropriate in a civil controversy before him. He can and
should reject it unless he concludes that the measure affords
appropriate protection of the class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs, that it protects against the kind of harm that was
suffered and further, that it is designed to afford protection
against the specific hazard presented in the controversy at hand.4
By the same token, the judge in a civil proceeding may remain
free to recognize as an excusable violation some piece of conduct
that would not or could not be so recognized in a criminal prosecution. Furthermore, the judge should be free to look at the
circumstances surrounding the violation when he faces the question as to how far, and to what risks, liability should be extended
in a given controversy. If he can elect to ignore the criminal
statute entirely, certainly he should be free to accept it subject
to such limitations, justifications and exclusions as he regards
appropriate. It seems to me that the existence of this wide range
of permissible latitude for judgment is a built-in feature of the
doctrine of negligence per se as it has been explained by many
49
courts and writers.
The approach to tort liability suggested in Dixie Drive It
Yourself v. American Beverage Company has been followed in
47. See text accompanying note 36, supra. See particularly Morris, The
Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HAiv. L. Rav. 453 (1933).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op TORTS § 288 (1965).
49. Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV.
L. REV. 453 (1933). A classic here is the opinion of Traynor, J., in Clinkscales
v. Carver, 22 Cal.2d 72, 136 P.2d 777 (1943). Also noteworthy is the opinion
in Phoenix Refining Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
See also James, Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11
LA. L. REV. 95 (1951).
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a substantial group of decisions involving a broad variety of
situations other than that of the unlawfully parked motorist.
It is interesting to note that these decisions have resulted favorably to plaintiff or to defendant in almost equal proportions.
We may turn our attention first to a few representative cases
involving injuries in traffic and presenting in somewhat novel
settings the problem of the intervening negligence of the third
party, which has been our chief concern up to this point.
5 0 the conduct
In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Dardar,
of three defendant drivers, A, B, and C, led to an intersectional
collision in New Orleans. A was proceeding at a reasonable
speed along a thoroughfare that was favored by stop signs on
intersecting streets. B, who was proceeding on such a street,
entered the intersection in disregard of the stop sign. He collided with A with such force that A's car passed out of control,
left the public way and crashed into an adjacent structure belonging to the plaintiff. Although B was negligent in entering
the superior street protected by a stop sign, the view of the sign
ahead was obscured by the presence of a vehicle belonging to
defendant C, which was parked within fifteen feet of the sign
in violation of a municipal ordinance. C, along with B, was subjected to liability for the damage inflicted on plaintiff's structure.
The opinion makes reference to Dixie in support of the court's
observation that the hazard of an intersectional collision which
is attributable to a driver's ignorance of the presence of a warning sign is one that falls directly within the scope of protection
of the ordinance violated by C. The court also pointed out that
the mere possibility that B might have proceeded into the intersection even if a view of the sign had not been afforded, does
not prevent a conclusion that the unlawful presence of C's parked
vehicle was a cause-in-fact of the mishap. It is noteworthy in
the Westchester Fire Insurance Company case that the court
treated the penal rule imposed by an ordinance just as though
a criminal statute had been involved.

An interesting variation of the same theme is found in
Vidrine v. General Fire & Casualty Co.5 1 The city of Ville Platte
maintained a traffic signal at the intersection of LaSalle Street
and Latour Street. That side of the light facing LaSalle Street
was not in operating condition. The light, however, was func50. 158 So.2d 239 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
51. 168 So.2d 449 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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tioning as to the signal facing Latour Street. Mrs. Vidrine
was proceeding down LaSalle Street and, finding the signal
inoperative, assumed that it had been intentionally extinguished
by the city for the time. She therefore concluded that LaSalle
Street, in the absence of the signal, was entitled to the right
of way, and she proceeded slowly across the intersection without stopping. At the same time Mrs. Ardoin, approaching the
intersection on Latour Street, saw the light was green and
assumed that she could proceed into the intersection without
stopping. The result was a collision. Suit was brought by both
Mrs. Ardoin and Mrs. Vidrine against the liability insurer of
the City of Ville Platte. The court concluded that the light
had been inoperative for several days and that the condition
was due to the negligence of the city. The defendant argued that
in Mrs. Ardoin's suit it could not be subjected to liability because
the negligence of the city was passive and the later conduct of
Mrs. Vidrine intervened and precluded liability on the part of
the municipality. Although the court conceded that Mrs. Vidrine's mistaken appraisal of the reason for the extinguished
signal amounted to negligence, yet it refused to hold that this
conduct in any way affected the liability of the city with respect
to Mrs. Ardoin, in whose favor the light was operating and served
as an invitation to proceed. The opinion relied upon the decision
in Dixie: "[T]he failure of the municipal employees to remedy
the defective traffic signal created an undue risk of harm to
traffic at the intersection. The intended purpose of the duty was
to prevent accidents such as that which occurred herein. '' 52 This
case is of particular interest because it did not involve the violation of a criminal statute, but rather the breach of a duty imposed by courts demanding reasonable care in the maintenance
of traffic signals.
There is sound reason for extending to judge-made rules
the same approach that prevails for rules enacted in criminal
statutes or ordinances. The body of law we call negligence can
appropriately be regarded as a mass of particularized duties
which share a common characteristic called "reasonable behavior." Although we tend to muse upon negligence as though
it enjoys an independent ideational existence of its own, yet in
truth negligence represents only an aggregate of very specific
exactions devised by courts to control particular items of human
52. Id.

at 454.
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conduct. In actual controversies no one is negligent in the abstract. Instead, a defendant is chargeable with negligence in that
he failed to maintain a reasonable diligent watchout, or he failed
to maintain a reasonable speed, or he failed to give an appropriate signal upon turning his vehicle, and so on. Always he is
chargeable with some specific shortcoming that is prohibited by
"law"; and "law" here can realistically be regarded only as the
body of particularized court-made rules with which the defendant's conduct has allegedly conflicted. It follows that these rules,
like the statutory rules of legislatures or city councils, must be
given appropriate boundaries by the courts in cases as they arise.
The protective limits of each prohibition must be fixed and there
must be a determination as to which hazards fall within or without the protective boundary. Hence the problem faced in Dixie
is not one that is peculiar to statutory interpretation. I suggest
that all the niceties of proximate cause language represent efforts
to bound legal duties in cases where no statute is involved without betraying the creative judicial process which, in truth, is at
work in each instance.
The following group of decisions is offered as representative
indications of the variety of situations in which the approach
of the Dixie decision has been employed even where no statute
or ordinance was involved. Dartez v. City of Sulphur,53 decided
by the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit, probably affords
the most helpful discussion of the non-statutory duty problem
that this writer has discovered. The facts show that the defendant city maintained a parking meter located on the sidewalk
which was so bent that it protruded at a 45 degree angle into
the adjacent sidewalk area. Plaintiff, a pedestrian, was aware
of this defect and on several occasions he had walked around
the bent meter. On the occasion in question he caught his foot
on a piece of bailing wire (for which the defendant was not
responsible) and in falling he fell across the parking meter post,
sustaining rather serious injuries to his private parts. His claim
against the city was denied in the court of appeal. The court was
not content merely to observe that the negligence of the city
was not the proximate cause of the injury or that the nature
of the accident was unforeseeable, or that the conduct of the
plaintiff intervened and rendered the city's negligence passive.
Instead, Tate, J., observed: "[T]he plaintiff's injuries resulted
53. 179 So.2d 482 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
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because when he fell the bent post happened to be in the way.
The duty imposed upon the city not to obstruct the walkway by
the bent pole did not include within its scope the protection of
those who might need the space occupied by the bent pole in
order to fall free of it and thus to hit the sidewalk instead, nor
to guard against resulting harms so highly extraordinary as to be
unforeseeable within reason.

'54

Other decisions in which the Dixie rationale was employed
in dealing with a non-statutory duty are listed in the footnotes. 55
54. Id. at 485.
55. There follow below representative decisions relating to trafflic accidents where no statute or ordinance was involved. For present purposes
it is of particular interest to recall that there is virtually no conceivable
piece of driver misconduct that cannot be regarded as a violation of some
one or more of the myriad Rules of the Road that are crowded into Title
32 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. At times the provisions of this title
are explicit in their commands, but with equal frequency, other measures
do no more than require that under given circumstances the operator
shall proceed "cautiously" or "with reasonable care."
Fontenot v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 896 (La. App. 3d Mr. 1966)
(passenger in defendant's cab propelled from cab while attempting to close
cab door which was not fully latched due to negligence of defendant). This
case, with an opinion by Tate, J., and a vigorous dissenting opinion by
Hood, J., is particularly instructive as a demonstration of two opposed
conceptions of the proper policy that should control in a given situation.
Hall v. State, 213 So.2d 169 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) (driver ran off road
and into canal, which resulted in the drowning of passenger; highway was
dangerously deceptive at the place of accident because of an absence of
warning signs; defendant's claim that inadvertence of the driver was intervening proximate cause was dismissed with reference to Dixie; obviously
one of the purposes of the duty to provide warning signs is to alert the
inattentive driver). Newton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 So.2d 744 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1968) (defendant A negligently lost control of car while attempting to
descend icy incline on highway overpass, and her car came to rest in the
left lane; plaintiff, a following motorist, brought his vehicle to a halt in the
face of the obstruction; defendant B, following plaintiff, failed to control
his car when faced with the sudden obstruction and struck plaintiff's car;
recovery was allowed against defendant A, who Initiated the congestion
through her negligence; the references to the Dixie decision are appropriate
and Interesting; this case can profitably be compared with the pileup situations discussed earlier in the text). Vander v. New York Fire & Marine
Underwriters Inc., 192 So.2d 635 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966) (plaintiff brought
car to halt so as to avoid striking children who suddenly moved into path
of vehicle; was struck by following car carelessly operated by defendant;
discussion Is noteworthy for special concurring opinion of Tate, J., who
observed that even if plaintiff were negligent in falling to discharge his
duty to observe the children, this duty does not exist for protection against
the risk of a rear-end collision with a careless motorist who follows).
Broussard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 So.2d 111 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1966) (oncoming truck on highway suddenly swerved into its left
lane during heavy fog which resulted in head-on collision with car driven
by defendant; suit instituted on behalf of passenger in defendant's car;
after settlement with trucker, suit was brought against defendant for proceeding too fast through the fog; the claim was dismissed: "Any duty of
[defendant] ... to proceed at a slower speed because of the fog was, insofar
as here pertinent, designed to prevent accident through his running into
objects in his path because of his inability to see them sooner because
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It may be noted in the Dartez case above that a resort by the
court to the broad policy approach of the Dixie decision resulted
in a conclusion that the risk encountered was excluded from the
protection of the duty imposed on defendant, and recovery was
denied for that reason. A similar denial of recovery will freof the fog . . . or else to prevent an accident resulting from collision with
those entitled to expect a slower approach of oncoming traffic who might
therefore cross rashly into his path because of obscured perception of his
approach ....
" Id. at 116). Muse v. Patterson & Co., 182 So.2d 665 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1965) (highway contractor who failed to post warning of
dangerous highway condition not liable to injured motorist who was aware
of the condition).
The following are representative of decisions involving situations outside the area of traffic accidents, and where no statute or ordinance was
involved. Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 144 So.2d 249 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962)
(physician negligently failed to designate on hospital chart that prescribed
dosage of digitalis should not be administered to infant by injection; was
subject to liability for death from overdosage even though the nurse
administering the drug should have been aware of danger and should have
administered the dosage orally; the hazard that a nurse may not be as
alert as her duty requires affords one of the underlying reasons for the
precautionary duties imposed upon the physician). Larned v. Wallace, 146
So.2d 434 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (somewhat similar to preceding case;
supervisory employee at oil well who so negligently arranged operational
plan of work that a danger to workers was created was not relieved of
liability for injury when casing tongs fell by reason of the carelessness of
a subordinate worker under the plan).
Perhaps the most revealing decision in this group is Todd v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 219 So.2d 538 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). The deceased's car,
which was properly parked on a city street, was knocked thirty feet forward
into a ditch through the negligent driving of defendant motorist. At this
time the deceased was not present. He was called to the scene of the accident
from a neighboring house and became highly excited over the mishap.
While he was watching several men In an effort to extricate his vehicle,
he suffered a heart attack and died. The issues Involved in the resulting
litigation were basic and far-reaching. Persons who suffer physical injury
as a consequence of emotional excitement brought about by witnessing an
accident, even though it involves an impact with a member of the family,
are almost uniformly denied recovery. The problem has usually been discussed in basic terms of the limited character of the duty to avoid an
infliction of emotional disturbance. The excellent opinion by Judge Culpepper deserves particular notice. The approach of the Dixie decision
dominates the entire discussion: "[T]he Inquiry Is whether the duty not to
run into parked automobiles on the street Includes protection against the
hazard that the owner of the vehicle may be in a house nearby and may
become so mentally distressed over the damages to his vehicle that Illness
or bodily harm may result. A mere statement of the question almost gives
the answer. As a matter of legal policy we hold the defendant's duty did
not include protection against such unforeseeable consequences as occurred
here." Id. at 544. The profound influence of the Dixie decision Is further
indicated by the insistence of the opinion that causation be restricted to
its simple factual significance. "[T]he first inquiry is whether defendant's
negligence was cause-in-fact of Mr. Todd's death. Clearly it was. But for
the fact that the defendant struck Mr. Todd's automobile and knocked it
In the ditch, Mr. Todd would not have suffered the mental anguish which,
according to the expert medical testimony discussed above, was the immediate cause of his death." Id. at 541. The court Is thus enabled to attack
the policy problem directly and uninfluenced by any confusion on the
matter of causation.
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quently follow the court's undertaking to determine whether
the risk and the duty are matched. The cases here are numerous.5
56. The decision in Jackson v. Beechwood, Inc., 180 So.2d 732 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1965) affords an excellent illustration of skillful employment of
the Dixie approach. Defendants maintained a borrow pit in violation of
a city ordinance. Plaintiff's intestate, a youth seventeen years of age and
a good swimmer, attempted to swim across the pit and sustained a cramp
which resulted in his drowning. In denying recovery the court observed:
"The ordinance was intended to guard against concealed or hidden hazards
which so frequently exist in excavations of this nature. Likewise, it protects
against the hazard of children of tender years who may fall or venture
into the pit. However, the ordinance does not make a landowner an insurer,
nor does it protect against the hazard that a trespasser capable of looking
after his own safety and an excellent swimmer will intentionally use the
artificial lake and drown therein." Id. at 733.
Another well conceived opinion in which the Dixie approach was
properly employed to prevent recovery is O'Connor v. St. Louis Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 217 So.2d 750 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969). As the facts indicated,
Magazine Street in New Orleans will accommodate four lanes of traffic,
but the two outside lanes are devoted to parking, leaving only two inner
lanes for vehicles in motion. The street is a one-way street. Defendant A
doubleparked its truck in order to make a delivery, thus obscuring the lefthand lane. Defendant B, driving a cab, suddenly encountered a child who
dashed out from behind the doubleparked truck. It is conceded that the
cab driver was unable to avoid the accident, and suit against him was
dismissed. The claim against the truck operator was based on its violation
of a city ordinance prohibiting doubleparking. The court properly denied
that the parents of the child were entitled to rely upon this violation.
The opinion observed: "It is our opinion that the injury which was
suffered by the young child was not one which the statute was contemplated
to protect. Had the truck been legally parked next to the curb the result
to the young child would have been the same had she run out from in front
of it into the street into the path of the approaching taxi." Id. at 753.
In Clingman v. Millerville Mud Sales, Inc., 146 So.2d 240 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962), the defendant negligently backed into the highway and was
struck by plaintiff who was driving at an excessive speed and failed to
bring her car under control. Her claim for injuries might have been dismissed on the basis of contributory negligence, but the plaintiff urged a
rationale based on his apparent misunderstanding that Dixie Insured
recovery against a negligent defendant despite any intervening negligence.
The court appropriately replied: "It [Dixie] does not stand for the proposition that once the defendant Is found negligent all subsequent or concurrent actions on the part of the plaintiff must be disregarded in determining whether or not a plea of contributory negligence will bar recovery
of the plaintiff." Id. at 242.
Parnell v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 245 La. 16, 156 So.2d 462 (1963),
is an Interesting decision by the Supreme Court in which the approach
of the Dixie decision was applied to the behavior of the plaintiff, and
resulted in a denial of recovery on the basis of contributory negligence.
The testimony showed that defendant's car was parked on the east parking
lane of a city street facing north. Defendant entered the car and started
to pull out, at which time he looked over his left shoulder to ascertain
whether traffic was coming and thus diverted his eyes from the road
directly ahead of him. As he went into motion he struck a bicycle operated
by plaintiff who, contrary to ordinance, was proceeding down the east
side of the same street and moving southward (with the result that he
was proceeding on his left side of the street). There was a resulting collision and plaintiff, the bicyclist, was Injured. It was conceded that the
defendant was negligent in diverting his eyes. The Supreme Court, however,
held that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence In being on
the lefthand side of the street in violation of the ordinance. The court

392

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

It will be noted that in most of the cited instances the court
undertook to explain the policy approach suggested in the Dixie
opinion in its effort to correct a not infrequent misapprehension
of the true purport of the decision. Counsel have pressed the
courts with a contention that intervening wrongdoing by a third
party (or even by the plaintiff himself) must be consistently
ignored in any suit against a defendant whose original negligence
set the stage for the ensuing accident. This, they appear to urge,
is what the Dixie decision stands for-it is the rule of the case.
observed, expressly following the approach of the Dixie decision: "Trafllo
laws heretofore mentioned are designed to protect the occupants of vehicles
against the very type of accident that occurred here. The plaintiff's violation of the ordinance and statute was negligence In this case for by driving
in the wrong direction he forsook the protection the statutes were designed
to afford him, and in so doing he endangered himself." Id. at 22, 156 So.2d
at 464. This writer has difficulty with the Parnelldecision with respect to the
proper view of the policy underlying the ordinance violated by the plaintiff.
Any bicyclist was entitled to be on the same side of the street with
defendant when the latter was backing out his car. Plaintiff's violation
therefore did not place him at a prohibited spot. He was merely proceeding
in an inappropriate direction for the side that he had chosen. It is difficult
to believe that the same accident would not have occurred If the plaintiff
had been at the same spot going In the opposite direction, in which case
he would not have been in violation of law.
According to the long established rule In Louisiana and elsewhere,
a motorist who, in violation of statute, leaves his car unattended with
the Ignition key In the lock, is nevertheless not responsible for the carelessness of a thief who steals the car and thereafter injures someone
through his driving. In Call v. Huffman, 163 So.2d 397 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1964), a victim of such an accident urged a reconsideration of the established position above. He insisted (mistakenly, I suggest) that under
the Dixie decision an intervening wrongful act (such as that of a thief)
can never serve to insulate an original wrongdoer from ultimate liability.
The court had no difficulty in denying recovery by pointing out, consistently with the approach of Dixie, that the purpose of the statute
violated in the instant case was not to insure the safety of persons on
the highway against the careless driving of a thief. Berluchaux v. Employers Mut. of Wausau, 194 So.2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) Is in accord.
In Muse v. Patterson & Co., 182 So.2d 665 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), the
right wheels of a motorist's car went off the highway and downward eleven
inches into a deeply depressed shoulder. In an effort to extricate the
vehicle back onto the road the motorist collided with the oncoming car
of plaintiff. In a suit against the defendant, the highway construction contractor, the plaintiff had urged Dixie on the court. He insisted that it
stands for the proposition that even though the driver of the car that was
experiencing difficulty might be regarded as negligent, this should not
prevent the earlier negligence of the defendant contractor from operating
as the proximate cause. In answer, the court observed that the only
shortcoming chargeable against the latter was Its failure to erect signs
indicating the presence of danger due to highway construction. The only
purpose of such signs, It continued, was to afford knowledge, and under
the circumstances of the instant case the motorist Involved was independently aware of the condition. Somewhat similar Is Martin v. State Dept.
of Highways, 175 So.2d 441 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) (alleged duty of highway department to provide special protective barrier on drawbridge did
not extend to the risk of injury to a car that was being operated without
brakes; note the close analogy to an absence of cause-in-fact).
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The writer suggests that this line of argument stems from an
unfortunately polarized approach. It is assumed (incorrectly)
that prior to the Dixie decision, intervening negligence of a third
party had served uniformly to break the chain of proximate causation between the original negligence of the defendant (which
accordingly became "passive") and the ultimate injury suffered
by the plaintiff. The second step in this same line of argument
is that the Dixie decision repudiated the old rule, and, by so doing,
it established its polar opposite in lieu thereof. I have attempted
earlier to point out what appears to be the fallacy here. 57 The
court in the Dixie decision only concluded that under the specific
facts as presented in that case the heedlessness of the motorist
approaching from the rear created a risk factor that fell within
the protective scope of the specific statutory rule prohibiting the
parking of a vehicle on the highway without warning. By the
same token there is implicit in the opinion the corollary proposition that should the court later find itself faced with a different
prohibition or with a different piece of intervening conduct, it
would be entirely free to follow the policy dictates of the newer
situation and to afford immunity to the original wrongdoer whenever this may appear to be sound policywise. Insofar as I can
see, the Dixie decision represents exclusively an approach or a
method of attack; there can be no such thing as the rule of the
Dixie decision which might require that the case be distinguished
in future litigation."
57. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
58. Of. Pierre v. Allstate Ins. Co., 221 So.2d 846 (La App. 4th Cir. 1969),
where the court of appeal reversed its position on rehearing in order to
give effect to a newly discovered basis upon which it felt it could "distinguish" the Dix4e decision.

